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THE SCOPE OF SECTION 14(d): WHAT IS A TENDER OFFER?
I. THE PROBLEM
In 1968 the Williams Act added § 14(d) to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. While § 14(d) regulates "tender offers," it does not define
the term.1 The legislative history of the bill and the rules of the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) provide little explication. This
note examines the definitional problems, analyzes the approaches of the
courts and the SEC, and suggests criteria for resolution of the various am-
biguities presented. The thesis of this note is that the legislative history
of the Williams Bill requires a balance to be struck between the broad ap-
plications of this remedial legislation and preservation of the tender offer
as a socially useful technique of corporate acquisition. To focus on the
need for this balance, the background of the legislation is outlined and its
theoretical basis is discussed to determine the intended function and bene-
ficiaries of the statute. rhereafter, a discussion of the impact of the Wil-
liams Act upon the tender offer, the role of state takeover legislation, and
the application of the Williams Act to specific situations is included to de-
scribe the current operation of the Act. This note concludes with a pre-
sentation of suggested criteria for interpretation.
II. THE "CLASSIC" OFFER
The "classic" tender offer is a public offer by a person other than the
issuer to purchase all or part of the equity securities of a corporation.2 The
public solicitation is .made by advertisements in various newspapers. These
advertisements announce an offer to purchase a specific number of shares
at a fixed price per share, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in an
offering letter. They also state when the offer terminates and explain
where the offering letter and the letter of transmittal may be obtained.3
The number of shares sought will depend upon whether the offeror seeks
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1970).
2 The following "prototype" illustrates the "classic" tender offer:
Corporation A, whose common stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
seeks to acquire 51% of the outstanding shares of common stock of Corporation B. The
B shares, which are listed on the American Stock Exchange, have been trading in the
last two months at a price between $18 and $20 per share. A intends to purchase as
much B stock as possible on the American Stock Exchange and to purchase one large
block of B stock from a mutual fund, which, A understands, wishes to dispose of its
holdings in B. After accumulation of a block of B shares in this manner, A intends to
make a public offer for tenders of B stock at $25 per share.
Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisitions by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 328(1967) (footnotes omitted).
3ee Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 2 at 335-38, for a discussion of the mechanics in-
volved in making a tender offer prior to the passage of the Williams Act. See also Aranow &
Einhorn, Essential Ingredients of the Cash Tender Invitation, 27 Bus. LAW. 415 (1972), for a
discussion of the tender offer mechanics after the Williams Act.
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working control, a majority position, or simply a voice in management.4
The company whose shares are being requested is known as the target
company, and the shareholders accepting the offer "tender"' their shares.
III. THE PRE-WILLIAMS ACT SITUATION:
COMPETING PHILOSOPHIES
Prior to the Williams Act, tender offers were not specifically regulated
by federal securities law,5 and the basic limitation on their use was that the
solicitations not be materially misleading. There were no specific disclo-
sure requirements, and there were no substantive regulations of the terms
of the tender offer. In many instances, the offeror had plans which, if
known, would have greatly influenced shareholder decisions of whether
or not to tender. Thus the offeree was often forced to make his investment
decision without knowing the identity, experience, and plans of the per-
sons who would control the target conipany if the bid were successful. The
offeree had no knowledge of (1) the source of the funds to be used in
purchasing the stock, (2) the terms and conditions of any loans used to
finance the offer, or (3) whether the person soliciting tenders even had
funds available to pay for the shares tendered. He had no way of knowing
whether his shares, if tendered, would be taken up or returned. Share-
holders were requested to make investment decisions without having the
benefit of all the information necessary to properly evaluate the offer.7
Pre-Williams Act criticism of the tender offer as a technique of ac-
quisition came from two camps. Some criticized the technique itself; others
focused on specific aspects of the tender offer, but were willing to leave
the technique available for corporate acquisition. Those who attacked the
tender offer per se characterized the offerors as "corporate raiders" set upon
liquidating the target companies over which they sought control.8 Those
4 Various types of control are possible. See Swanson, S. 510 and the Regulation of Cash Ten-
deyr Offers. Distinguishing St. George from the Dragon, 5 HARV. J. LEGIS. 431, 437 n.22
(1968).
5 See the discussion of the inadequacy of the law at the time of the passage of the Williams
Bill contained in H.R. 1711 at 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2812-13 (1968).
6An action under Rule 10b-5 was possible in the pre-Act tender offer situation. However,
rule lob-5 provided an inadequate remedy to both the non-tendering shareholders and the tar-
get companies, since neither had the standing to brivg private actions for damages. This situa-
tion was due to the so-called "Birnbaum Doctrine," promulgated in Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), which held that
Rule 10b-5 actions for damages required that the injured party be either a purchaser or seller of
securities.
7 H.R. 1711, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), phrases it this way:
[Where no information is available about the persons seeking control, or their plans,
the shareholder is forced to make a decision on the basis of a market price which re-
flects an evaluation of the company based on the assumption that the present manage-
ment and its policies will continue.
4 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 2811,2813 (1968).
s The introductory remarks of Senator Williams for S. 2731 (the first version of the Williams
Bill introduced) illustrate this attitude:
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who focused on criticism of specific aspects of the tender offer technique
had a better reasoned line of attack; they felt that the shareholder did not
have available sufficient information to enable him to make informed deci-
sions regarding the advisability of selling his stock to the offeror. SEC
Chairman Cohen championed the latter attack and strongly favored regu-
lation of tender offers 9 His premise was that investors should be ade-
quately informed about the individual or group seeking control of the tar-
get before deciding whether or not to sell pursuant to the tender offer.
On the other side of the debate were those who were opposed to the
regulation of tender offers, fearing that over-regulation would result and
that over-regulation would destroy the availability of the technique. Pro-
fessor Manne best states this point of view.10 His argument is that the
tender offer gives positive advantages both to target shareholders and to
the general economy. The benefits include assuring competitive efficiency
among corporate managers, increasing management accountability to its
shareholders, and affording the shareholders an opportunity to secure a
premium for their shares should they sell pursuant to a tender offer.
Tender offers are generally made for the shares of corporations which
have rates of return on net worth or profits which are low, relative to their
industry grouping." Thus the tender offer functions to protect small in-
vestors by "weeding out" inefficient managements. Furthermore, while
there are federal laws to deal with management fraud, there is no tech-
nique which would readily permit the replacement of inept or complacent
management. The proxy contest is the prinary device available for this
purpose, but it is very expensive and most often unsuccessful. In many
cases, therefore, the tender offer represents the only real opportunity to
oust inefficient management.
In recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corporate shells after
white-collar pirates have seized control with funds from sources which are unknown in
many cases, then sold or traded away the best assets, later to split up most of the loot
among themselves ....
111 CONG. REc. 28257-60 (Oct. 22, 1965). Note the implicit assumption in this line of thought
that liquidation is an evil per se. This is not necessarily the case since many of the companies for
which tender offers were made were "better off dead than alive."
9 Cohen, Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 Bus. LAw. 611 (1968); but see Manne, Cash
Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DukE L.J. 230.
10 [The greater benefits of the take-over scheme probably inure to those least conscious
of it. Apart from the stock market, we have no objective standard of managerial ef-
ficiency. Courts, as indicated by the so-called business-judgment rule, are loath to sec-
ond-guess business decisions or remove directors from office. Only the take-over scheme
provides some assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate managers and there-
by affords strong protection to the interests of vast numbers of small, non-controlling
stockholders.
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965).
" See Vance, Is Your Company a Takeover Target?, 47 HARV. Bus. REV. 93, 94-97 (May-
June 1969).
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IV. THE WILLIAMS ACT AND SECTION 14(d):
IMPACT AND INTENDED BENEFICIARIES
A. The Disclosure Requirements
Congress rejected the more vitriolic criticism of the tender offer and
left the technique intact by adopting the basic line of reasoning advocated
by Chairman Cohen. The Williams Act provides only a general frame-
work for the regulation of tender offers and leaves the formulation of de-
tails to the SEC by vesting it with rule-making powers.' 2  As originauy
passed, the Act applied only to cash tender offers; however, the 1970
amendments included exchange offers as well.'3
The Act has two principal effects on the "classic" tender offer situation.
First, it requires any person making a statutory tender offer to disclose
certain information. The SEC has provided that the information required
to be filed under § 13(d) also be filed under § 14(d) (1), and has further
provided that most of this information must be included in the published
offer. 4 The disclosure emphasis is to inform the shareholder of the iden-
tity, background, and future plans of the offeror, in order to place the of-
feree on an equal footing with the offeror in assessing the future of the
corporation and the value of the shares.' 5 Consequently, the shareholder
may be in a position to make an intelligent choice of management. If the
future looks bleak under the present management, he may tender pursuant
to the offer; on the other hand, if it looks promising under present man-
agement or if it looks unpromising under the offeror's management he
may refuse to tender.
This choice is the basic philosophy underlying the proxy rules, and
the legislative history of the Williams Act indicates a similar intent with-
in § 14(d).6 The basic idea is to give the shareholder the most com-
plete picture possible of each of the contending parties so he may choose
the management team which he feels will provide the best future for his
investment. However, the tender offer situation is different from the proxy
situation. The tender offer shareholder is not really performing a "pure"
choice of management function in many cases. Rather, his decision to
tender may represent a decision to take his money out of the target and in-
1215 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d) (1), (8) (C) (1970).
13 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (8). The basic difference between the cash tender offer and the ex-
change offer is the form of consideration used. The former uses cash; the latter uses securities.
14 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (f) (1972).
15 The persons seeking control... have information about themselves and about their
plans which, if known to investors, might substantially change the assumptions on
which the market price is based. This bill is designed to make the relevant facts
known so that shareholders have a fair opportunity to make their decision.
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811,2813 (1968).
16 'The cash tender offer is similar to a proxy contest, and the committee could find no rea-
son to continue the present gap in the Federal securities laws which leaves the cash tender offer
exempt from disclosure provisions." Id.
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vest it elsewhere. In such a case, it is not merely a decision between two
management teams as is the case in the proxy situation. Nevertheless,
even though the two situations are not exactly parallel, the basic thrust of
the disclosure rationale is applicable in the tender offer situation. The
reason is that not all offers are made for the entire outstanding class
of the target; indeed, many are made for fractional amounts. In those
cases, shares will be accepted on a pro rata basis, and the offeree will be
forced to keep at least some of his shares in the target corporation. In
other cases, even though the offer is for the entire class, the shareholder
may decide not to tender all his shares. Instead, he will tender only part
of his shares in an amount he considers sufficient to ensure the success of
the tender offer, and he will keep the rest in the target corporation for
investment purposes. In these cases, the shareholder is performing the
same choice-of-management function presupposed in the proxy situation.
In any event, the operative effect of the decision to tender in a successful
offer is the same as the effect of a successful proxy contest-the target man-
agement has been 1'voted out." Therefore, the aim of the disclosure pro-
visions of § 14(d) is to permit an informed decision by the stockholder
in cases in which he would not otherwise have adequate information, thus
allowing him to perform a choice-of-management function rather than
forcing him to become a "pawn" in a struggle for control between the
management and the offeror.17 Viewed in this context, the disclosure re-
quirements of § 14(d) are dearly not intended to prevent the use of the
tender offer and do not seem intended to seriously impede the making of
the tender offer.
In one sense, the parties protected by the Williams Act are all the
parties to the tender offer: the target company, the offeror; and the offeree
shareholder. However, dose analysis reveals that while all three parties
are protected to a certain extent, the target company and the offeror are
protected only indirectly and only to the extent their protection inures to
the benefit of the shareholders involved. The target company is protected
by giving it time to respond to the tender offer, because a policy judgment
has been made that the shareholders need this information input in order
to intelligently respond to the offer. Similarly, the offeror is only indirectly
protected because shareholder protection requires that the tender offer be
available as a vehicle to oust inept or complacent management. Thus, the
primary beneficiary is the shareholder offeree, and it is to protect him that
the interests of the other two parties to the tender offer must be balanced
in each case.
17 The bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in
favor of the person making the takeover bid. It is designed to require full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and
management equal opportunity to fairly present their case,
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B. The Substantive Regulations ,l
The second effect of § 14(d) is to impose certain substantive require-
ments on the terms of the tender offer itself. These substantive regula-
tions of the mechanics of the tender offer may, in certain cases, have a det-
rimental effect on the ability of the offeror to make a successful offer.
However, once again the policy decision has been made that the potential
danger to the viability of the tender offer technique is outweighed by the
advantages to the shareholders. Therefore, a brief analysis of these pro-
visions is required.
1. The Withdrawal Provision
Section 14(d) (5) provides that persons tendering their shares pursuant
to a statutory tender offer may withdraw the shares tendered at any time
within seven days after the date the offer is made, or at any time after 60
days from the date of the original offer, unless the Commission prescribes
otherwise by rule or regulation. The effect of this provision is to prolong
the period for which the offer remains open; therefore, it can hinder the
speed and surprise elements crucial to the success of a tender offer. The
longer it takes for the offeror to attain the goals of the offer, the more dif-
ficult it becomes for the offer to succeed. This is particularly true with
cash tender offers since they require large amounts of capital and the pro-
longing of the offer makes it harder for the offeror to retain his financing.
In addition, the longer the time span of the offer, the more time manage-
ment has to marshal its resources t9 combat it,:" thus further lessening the
prospects for success of the offer.
2. The Pro Rata Provision
If a tender offer is made for less than all of the outstanding securities of
a class of an issuer, and if within the first ten days after publication of the
offer more shares are deposited than the offeror is bound or willing to take
up, then § 14(d) (6) provides that the securities so deposited must be
taken up pro rata according to the number of shares tendered by each of-
feree. The tender offer, even though at a high price, becomes less attrac-
tive than a market transaction because only a pro rata number of shares
may be accepted and the balance is frozen for as long as 60 days, during
which time the market price of the shares may decline."9
I8 The target corporation management does have an effective array of defensive tactics. The
three general lines of defense are as follows: (1) create conditions that make it more difficult for
the opposition to obtain the desired voting control; (2) make the company less attractive to the
offeror; and (3) weaken the offeror's ability to proceed with the tender offer. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the tactics available to the target company, See Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over
Bids-Defensive Tactics, 23 Bus. LAw. 115 (1967).
19 See Mundheim, Tender Offers, 2 REV. OF SEC. REG. 265 (1969).
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3. The Consideration Provision
When the offeror varies the terms of a statutory tender offer by increas-
ing the consideration offered to some shareholders before the expiration of
the offer, § 14(d) (7) requires the offeror to pay the increased considera-
tion to all those who have tendered pursuant to the offer. This provision
aims at assuring fair treatment of those persons who tender their shares at
the beginning of the tender period. However, from the offeror's point of
view, the effect is to make the tender offer technique less attractive, since
it makes the offer potentially more expensive for him and hinders his ef-
forts to make a failing offer seem more attractive to shareholders.
V. LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
There are certain limitations on the scope of the statutory tender offer
inherent in the language of § 14(d).20 The tender offer must be (1) for
securities registered pursuant to § 12; (2) for any equity security of an in-
surance company which would have bepn required to register under § 12,
but for the exemption in § 12(g) (2) (G); or, (3) for any equity security
issued by a dosed-end investment company registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940.21 Since the combined effect of §§ 12(a) and (b)"
is to require all securities on the exchanges to be registered; the statutory
group encompasses all equity securities listed on the national exchanges.
Also, § 12(g) (1)2' requires that an unlisted security be registered under
§ 12 if that security is held of record by 500 or more persons and is issued
by a company with at least $1,000,000 in assets. In addition to these secu-
rities, § 12 permits the registration of any other equity security at the option
of the issuer. It is to be noted that a security does not fall within the Act
until its § 12 registration has become effective. 24
Because § 14(d) speaks of a tender offer for a "class of equity secu-
rity" registered pursuant to § 12, it arguably applies only if the offeror
seeks to acquire the entire class. If so, then an offer, for less than the en-
tire class, might be exempt from the requirements of § 14(d). However,
the argument fails in view of further language in § 14(d) (6) which re-
fers specifically to tender offers "for less than all the outstanding equity
securities of a class." This language presupposes that the Act would apply
to the partial tender offer, and, indeed, this is the position taken by the
SEC staff.25
20 For an in-depth analysis of this topic, see Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers,
15 N.Y.LF. 462 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bromberg]. The article is reproduced in A.
BROMBERG, SEC.JUITIS FRAUi, Revised Section 6.3 (1969).
21 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(1) (1970).
2215 U.S.C. §§ 781(a), (b) (1970).
2315 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1) (1970).
24 Bromberg supra note 20, at 474.
2 Fleischer & Flom, PLI Transcript Series No. 1, Texas Gulf Sulphur-Insider Disclosure
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By its terms, § 14(d) reaches only those offers which, if successful,
would result in the offeror's direct or indirect beneficial ownership of more
than five percent of a class of the covered securities.2 6 According to §
14(d) (3), a class of securities is comprised of the outstanding securities
not held by the issuer. Thus, an offer for 5.1 percent of the class of se-
curities is within the coverage of the statute; furthermore, an offer for four
percent of the class sought by a "person" owning two percent of the se-
curities is also within the statute. However, an offer which does not ex-
ceed two percent of the class of sought-after securities when combined with
all the acquisitions of the same class of securities by the same person in the
preceding 12 months, does not trigger the statute. Therefore, any offeror
owning a substantial block of securities for more than a year can make an
offer for two percent or less of the outstanding securities of the target
company without the statute's becoming operative. A person can, how-
ever, through casual market transactions achieve functionally the same re-
sults as those protected against in the statute. Just as with a conventional
offer, such acquisitions may greatly affect the market for an issuer's shares
and may result in a change in the control of the issuer. The inference from
§ 14(d) (8) (B) is that when a person makes periodic acquisition of shares
in the open market in an amount that would result in the ownership of
more than five percent, it is equatable to a statutory offer unless the ac-
tivities fall within the two percent exemption. In this area, the statutory
emphasis on "acquisition" indicates that gross acquisition is the factor to
be considered.2  Therefore, any offsetting sales of acquired securities dur-
ing the 12-month period should be disregarded in figuring whether or not
the offeror has reached the two percent level. Furthermore, if the offer is
for less than two percent but the offeror reserves the right to take more
shares if they are tendered, it is probably a statutory offer.28  The rationale
for this assumption is that the potential consummation of the tender offer
above the five percent level is at least partially within the control of the of-
feror. This approach seems mandatory, since if it were not the policy, the
statutory requirements of § 14(d) could be circumvented with relative
ease.
Section 14(d) includes offers made by the mails, any interstate instru-
mentality, any facility of a national securities exchange, "or otherwise."
Problems [hereinafter cited as PLI Transcript Series No. 1]. Comments by Mr. Levenson of the
SEC staff at 345: "'We interpret the statute to cover tender offers for even less than the entire
class outstanding."
26 If the offer is for less than five percent of the outstanding class, the offeror's other holdings
are crucial to a determination as to whether or not the statute is operative. Specific rules regard-
ing beneficial ownership through options and convertibles for § 14(d) have not been promul-
gated by the SEC; however, the precedents under the Securities Exchange Act §§ 13(e) and 16
are suitable guidelines to be followed in this area.
27 Bromberg, supra note 20, at 476. See also Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure in Connection
with Cash Take-over Bids: The New Regulations, 24 BUS. LAW. 19,20 (1968).
2 8 Bromberg, supra note 20, at 476.
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With this all-inclusive language, the mode of communication from the of-
feror to the shareholders is not a viable basis for excluding some offers
'from the requirements of the Act, and even a purely intrastate offer made
orally or by hand-delivery would fall within the statute. This analysis
is reinforced by the statutory language "first published or sent or given to
security holders" used throughout § 14(d) in reference to the modes of
communication covered.=2
VI. THE DURATION OF THE OFFER
A. When Does the Statutory Offer Commence?
Under § 14(d), it is not clear whether the offer has begun when the
offeror makes open-market purchases of the target company stock, when
the offeror talks to potentially friendly holders of large blocks of the tar-
get's stock, or when the offeror arranges for advertising to be placed in the
newspapers. The person engaging in market transactions or in transac-
tions with large numbers of shareholders does have the potential to de-
prive the stockholders of information important to their investment deci-
sions. Therefore, using the idea that certain "pre-offer" activities may work
to the disadvantage of target shareholders, it is possible to argue that a
statutory tender offer commences when the offeror who intends to effect
control begins to accumulate stock of the target company. This accumu-
lation might begin with the potential offeror's purchasing stock in the mar-
ket, by contacting mutual funds holding substantial amounts of the stock
and making arrangements to purchase them, or in suggesting that mutual
funds acquire holdings of the stock which the offeror would subsequently
purchase.31 However, § 14(d) leaves unsettled the question whether the
statutory offer can be said to commence with these "pre-offer" activities.
From the offeror's perspective, the problem is most acute when a cash of-
fer is contemplated, and prior purchases that would not otherwise be
deemed to constitute a statutory offer may be integrated with the later for-
mal offer. This type of integration was suggested by SEC Release Number
29 This is also an implicit holding in Cattlemen's Investment Corporation v. Fears, 343 F.
Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972), in which many of the defendants activities were in the form
of personal visits, and the court held them to be statutory tender offers.
3o Any difficulties caused by the unsettled question of when the statutory offer- begins are fur-
ther complicated by the broad concept of a group and of group action within § 14(d). The
term "person" is defined in § 14(d)(2), and the legislative history indicates that any person or
group obtaining the benefits of ownership of securities "by reason of any contract, understanding,
relationship, or other arrangement," 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2811, 2818 (1968),
falls within the term "person." Recent case law regarding the Williams Act indicates that the
concept of the group and group action will be given a broad construction by the courts. Bath
Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
a Before making a tender offer, the offeror very often "tips" some friendly institutions con-
cerning its proposed plans. The institutions then purchase the target company's stock in hopes
of tendering it to the offeror when the formal tender offer is announced. The procedure is known
as "warehousing." See Thomas, Warehousing, 3 REv. OF SEC. REG. 975 (1970).
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8595' which accompanied rule lob-13. In spite of a statement that pre-
tender purchases are not "specifically prohibited" by the rule, the release
suggests that purchases immediately prior to the tender offer may in some
instances work to the disadvantage of persons who are later invited to ten-
der their securities.
Rule lob-13 requires that the offeror purchase securities of the target
company only pursuant to the specific tender or exchange offer involved.
'The rule prohibits direct and indirect purchases, as well as any arrange-
ment to purchase any security of the target issuer and any security imme-
diately convertible into, or exchangeable for, such security. This is true re-
gardless of any conditions stated in the tender offer. Furthermore, the
rule requires that if the offeror does purchase similar securities of the same
class in the market during the period of the tender offer, he must pur-
chase all tendered securities at the price paid in purchases made otherwise
than pursuant to the tender offer or at the tender offer price, whichever
is higher.
However, even though § 14(d) encompasses transactions which do
not fit within the "classic" tender offer model, these initial steps should not
be considered as the beginning phases of the tender offer. Traditionally
the offeror has been able to purchase securities of the target company pri-
vately or on the open market without disclosing his purchases or inten-
tions. Therefore, for purposes of § 14(d), a tender offer should not begin
the moment the offeror acquires target securities unless something in the
theoretical basis of the statute requires a change from pre-Act law. There
is no such requirement in § 14(d), and the offeror is able to purchase suf-
ficient blocks of stock on an undisclosed basis before making the formal
offer to the shareholders. In fact, there are no specific provisions in the
Williams Act to deal with this tactic until the offeror acquires five percent
of the outstanding class. Therefore, the person (or group) who begins
with the plan of acquiring five percent and carries out the plan is not sub-
ject to the provisions of § 14(d) until the acquisitions go over the five per-
cent levelY3
On the other hand, if the Act were to be read to define a tender offer
as existing before the acquisition of five percent when the offeror takes
these first steps in a plan leading to a formal offer, disclosure of the kind
required in Schedule 13D would have to accompany the preliminary steps
and the inhibiting regulatory requirements of §§ 14(d) (5), (6), and (7)
would also apply. The ultimate result would be that the initial steps
woulcLbecome almost impossible to accomplish and the impact on the abil-
32 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8595 (May 5, 1969), [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder) CCH FED. SEC. LAw REP. 5 77,706, at 83,616.
33 However, this tactic may generate difficulties with Rule lOb-5, especially in the case of the
seller of securities who had no idea of the offeror's motives behind the transaction and who, as
a result, was foreclosed from his pro rata quantum of the tender offer premium.
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ity to make a successful tender offer would be fatal, since it would take
away the crucial element of surprise. Therefore, since defining a tender
offer to exist before the acquisition of five percent would significantly dis-
courage or even preclude the use of the "classic" tender offer technique,
it is an "incorrect" definition in view of the § 14(d)'s implicit recognition
of the positive aspects of a regulated tender offer. However, with the 1970
amendment reducing the reporting threshold from ten percent to five per-
cent, there is much less practical opportunity to obtain a significant foot-
hold prior to the Schedule 13D filing requirement. Thus this entire discus-
sion is of lesser importance than it was under the original ten percent
(standard. Even so, a cautious approach would be prudent in this area in
order to avoid pre-offer application of the disclosure and regulatory re-
quirements of § 14(d).
B. When Does the Tender Offer End: Are Two Offers Really One?
Attempts to avoid the expense to the offeror created by the increased
consideration provision of § 14(d) (7) may give rise to a second kind of
integration doctrine whereby a court may integrate two or more tender
offers made by the same person. If an offeror makes a series of tender of-
fers for the same security with time intervals between the offers, each for a
small lot of stock and at increasing prices, such tender offers would prob-
ably be considered a subterfuge to avoid paying the highest price to all de-
positing shareholders in a single offer. When one tender offer is termi-
nated and another is begun immediately or shortly thereafter, the two of-
fers may be integrated under a substance-over-form theory. The greater the
time interval between the two tender offers, the less likely the operation
of this integration doctrine. However, time alone may not be the deciding
factor. If at the time of the closing of the first tender offer the bidder has
an intention to make a further tender offer, integration would appear ap-
plicable. When there is no intention to make a further tender offer at
the time the first tender offer expires, and subsequent events, not foreseen
during the first offer, make a further offer desirable, then integration may
not be applicable, depending upon the time interval and the nature of the
subsequent events.34
VII. THE ROLE OF STATE LEGISLATION:
A BRIEF LOOK AT THE OHIO TAKE-OVER AcT35
Several states have enacted take-over legislation, and the impact of that
legislation should be noted briefly at this point.8 6 This discussion is not
24 Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439-Growing Pains? Some Inter-
pretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How. LJ. 654, 712 (1971).
35 OHIO Rzv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1972).
36 For an excellent and in-depth discussion of this topic, see Symposium, Controlling Cot-
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intended as an in-depth analysis of the Ohio Take-Over Act or of any state
take-over bill, and is included for the limited purpose of showing that if
such state legislation does exist to govern tender offers, its specific terms
may obviate the definitional problems caused by the ambiguous coverage
of the Williams Act. The Ohio Take-Over Act, for example, regulates
any takeover bid for equity securities of an Ohio corporation or of any Ohio-
-based corporation. Since the Ohio Act places stringent requirements upon
the offeror but leaves the target management unregulated, it has a much
greater negative impact on the offeror than does the federal law. The
Ohio Act does not contain the § 14(d) (1) restriction on equity securities
registered under § 12 or on equity securities of registered dosed-end in-
vestment companies. Thus while the Ohio Act is limited to Ohio and
Ohio-based companies, its operative scope includes companies which are
too small or too closely held to fall within the scope of the Williams Act.
Under the Ohio Act, a takeover bid is defined as a "tender offer" for
equity securities of an Ohio or Ohio-based corporation if after acquisition
the offeror would be the direct or indirect, record or beneficial owner of
more than ten percent of the outstanding equity securities of any class.
37
Like the Williams Act, the Ohio law fails to define "tender offer." How-
ever, the Ohio Act contains specific exemptions which make the major
definitional ambiguities created by the Williams Act somewhat academic.
Providing that the transactions must be for the- offeror's sole account and
be made in good faith and not for the purpose of avoiding the statute,
the Ohio Act specifically excludes cash bids to 50 or fewer persons and ex-
change bids not involving a public offering under the Securities Act of
1933.38 Also, the Ohio Act does not apply to tender offers if the target
company directors recommend acceptance of the bid."' Therefore, the
specific provisions of state law should be consulted to see if they control
any definitional ambiguities which would exist if only the Williams Act
were applicable.
VIII. BEYOND THE "CLASSIC" OFFER
A. Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears4"
In Cattlemen's, the defendant argued that the operation of § 14(d)
should be limited to the "classic" tender offer situation. Plaintiff alleged
that Fears was the beneficial owner of all shares of Cattlemen's common
stock owned of record by National Pioneer Insurance Company. From
December 1 to December 10, 1972, Fears acquired in his own name addi-
porate Takeover Bids: State Regulation and the Ohio Approach, with a foreword by Louis Loss,
21 CASE WEST. RES. L. REv. 605 (1970).
3 7 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1972).
38Id. §§ 1707.041 (A) (1) (b)-(c).
39 Id. § 1707.041(A)(1)(d).
40 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
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tional common stock of plaintiff and on December 10, 1971, was the
beneficial owner of an aggregate of 12 percent of Cattlemen's outstanding
shares. On these facts, Cattlemen's claimed that Fears acted in violation
of § 14(d) by making a "tender offer or a request or invitation for tenders"
of this class of equity securities while in possession of more than five per-
cent of the class of shares, without complying with the filing requirements
of the Act. The alleged tender offer consisted of telephone calls, use of
the mails, and personal visits with the shareholders of the company. The
activities were carried on either personally by Fears or through his agents.
Fears did not deny the factual allegations; rather he claimed that his ac-
tivities constituted "privately negotiated purchases" and that Congress did
not intend to include all acquisitions of stock within the term "tender
offer." His argument was that § 14(d) was intended only to encompass
that which traditionally constituted a tender offer; that is, the general of-
fer by means of widespread publicity to all known shareholders. Focusing
on the fact that a tender offer is usually made by advertisements in a major
newspaper, the defendant claimed that no action by him or his agents had
been either alleged or-'shown to fall within the traditional definition of a
tender offer.
The court held for the plaintiff and said that requests or invitations for
tenders of securities by telephone, mail, and personal visits are tender offers
within the meaning of § 14(d) (1). Specifically, the court said that an
active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders in person, over
the telephone, and through the mails, presented potential dangers which §
14(d) was intended to alleviate. Therefore, by not complying with the
statute, Fears deprived shareholders of information crucial to their invest-
ment decisions and thus denied them the fair treatment demanded by §
14(d). The court concluded
that contracts utilized by the defendant were even more designed than a
general newspaper advertisement, the more conventional type of "tender
offer," to force a shareholder into making a hurried investment decision
without access to information, in circumvention of the statutory purpose....
When we consider the plain language of the statute and rules and the pur-
pose to be served, we have no hesitancy in concluding that the activities
of the defendant in making contact with plaintiff's shareholders by the use
of the mails, telephone calls, and personal visits, for the purpose of pur-
chasing their shares, constitute "tender offers for, or a request or invitation
for tender offers of" their stock within the meaning of the statute.41
The result in Cattlemen's is not surprising, and its rationale is basi-
cally sound. Although § 14(d) uses an undefined "trigger" clause, the
statutory language does encompass offers other than those which have
traditionally been designated as tender offers. The operation of § 14(d)
is not to be determined by the form in which the offer is made; rather,
41 Id. at 1252.
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its operation begins with the "classic" offer and extends to other transac-
tions which present the investor with the kinds of dangers which prompted
passage of the Williams Act. The Court in Cattlemen's focused on this
idea when it concluded that the activities by Fears had the effect of forcing
shareholders to make hurried investment decisions without access to ade-
quate information.42
This approach is supported by the language of § 14(d) (8) (C), which
offers an insight into the intended scope of the "trigger" clause.4' This
subsection gives the SEC the authority to exempt certain activities which
would ordinarily constitute tender offers within the statute. It gives the
Commission the power to make such exemptions when an offer or request
for invitations of tenders is not entered into for the purpose of changing
or influencing the control of the issuer. The negative inference drawn
from this language is that activities which do have the purpose or effect
of changing or influencing the control of the issuer are offers within the
statute so that the Commission cannot exempt such activities through its
rule-making powers. This subsection clearly intends inclusion of the "clas-
sic" tender offer; however, its importance is that it goes further and con-
templates situations in which the elements of the "classic" offer are not
present, but in which the activities would still be encompassed by the stat-
ute. Section 14(d) (8) (C) ends with the language "or otherwise as not
comprehended within the purposes of this subsection." This refers to the
activities specifically exempted from the statute's operation by §§
14(d) (8) (A) and (B) which expressly exclude acquisitions during the
preceding 12 months which are below the two percent level and offers
made by the issuer of the security involved. Therefore, § 14(d)(8)(C)
gives the SEC the power to exempt from the operation of the statute ac-
tivities which are not "classic" tender offers and which are not specifically
4 2 The court in Cattlemen's characterized the purpose of § 14(d) as follows:
We think it dear that the purpose of The Congress, in the enactment of the legislation
in question, is to provide investors who hold equity interests in public corporations,
material information with respect to the potential impact of any effort to acquire control
of a company, sufficient time within which to make an unhurried investment decision
as to whether to dispose of or retain their securities, and to assure fair treatment of the
investors. We deem it abundantly clear that there is an obligation on persons attempt-
ing to gain control of a corporation by means of tender offers to make the required
filings and disclosure.
Id. at 1251.
43 The section reads as follows:
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any offer for, or request or invita-
tion for tenders of, any security . ...
(C) which the Commission, by rules or regulations or by order, shall exempt from
the provisions of this subsection as not entered into for the purpose of, and not having
the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as not com-
prehended within the purposes of this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (8) (C) (1970).
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exempted within § 14(d) (8), but which still have inherent in them the
dangers intended to be alleviated by passage of the Williams Act.
Reading § 14(d) (8) (C) in this manner, it seems that any widespread
solicitation of stock other than through normal market purchases is a
tender offer within § 14(d) unless the activity is specifically excluded by
the SEC. The Commission has issued regulation 14d-2, excluding certain
modes of communication from the operation of § 14(d) (1). If the above
reading of § 14(d) (8) (C) is applied to the exempted communications
within regulation 14d-2, then presumably those communications would
have been within § 14(d) had they not been exempted by the regulation,
even though the activities exempted (for example, advice from a broker
or lawyer) would not generally fall within any definition of the "classic"
offer.
To give the statute such a broad scope means that § 14(d) will include
transactions in which it will be virtually impossible for the offer to com-
ply with the substantive provisions of §§ 14(d) (5),(6), and (7). How-
ever, focusing on the Bill's rejection of the type of criticism which centered
on the technique itself, § 14(d) should be read to affirm the idea that the
tender offer is a positive factor in business practice which should not be
unnecessarily inhibited. If the method and scope of regulation as shaped
through the definition of the "trigger" clause were to result in the insula-
tion of management from outside challenge, then the goal of investor pro-
tection embodied as the central purpose of the Act is thwarted by an in-
appropriate definition of the statutory offer. Therefore, to the extent the
operative phrase is undefined, any working definition adopted either by
the SEC or by the courts should embrace the concept that the tender offer
is to be preserved, not regulated out of existence. Any definition which
not only regulates but effectively discourages the use of tender offers would
be an "incorrect" one within the meaning of the statute. The statute
should be read not only to provide direct investor protection but also to
ensure a readily available method for "weeding out" inept management.
Hence, one can argue that any transaction to which §§ 14(d) (5), (6),
and (7) cannot be practically applied should not constitute tender offers.
While Cattlemen's definitely moves the scope of § 14(d) beyond the
"classic" tender offer, it gives no indication as to whether the broader read-
ing of the "trigger" clause suggested above is to be adopted or whether
a limitation will be imposed in cases in which §§ 14(d) (5), (6) and (7)
cannot practicably be applied. Neither the court nor the SEC has directly
dealt with this aspect of the definitional problem. Where the SEC has
acted, however, the results tend toward the more expansive reading of
§ 14(d), even to the extent of effectively precluding the use of certain
activities by forcing application of the substantive provisions of the Act.
The "special bid" is an illustration of this approach by the SEC.
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B. The Special Bid
The special bid is an arrangement permitted by the stock exchanges in
which the volume of the stock sought by the offeror cannot readily be ob-
tained by ordinary transactions. It is a technique to which the substantive
portions of § 14(d) cannot be applied without destroying its availability;
however the SEC has taken the position that the bid falls within the
ambit of § 14(d). It should be noted that when a special bid is included
as a tender offer, it is only operative as such if the bid would result in a
direct or indirect beneficial ownership of five percent or more of the out-
standing class of securities. The procedure involved in the special bid
relieves the seller from paying a commission and requires the buyer to pay
an extra commission. The special bid is on a pro rata basis for a maximum
of only 15 minutes after it is announced on the tape; after that, it is on a
first-come first-served basis. Since it frequently involves no soliciting ma-
terial for the informational use of the target company's shareholders, and
since frequently the name of the offeror is not disclosed, the tactic involves
many of the risks and dangers of the surprise takeover bid which led to
the passage of the Williams Act.
The SEC has taken the position that a stock exchange special bid is
"ordinarily" a tender offer covered by the specific statutory requirements of
§ 14(d). 44 Its rationale revolves around several basic considerations:
(1) the need to make information available to the investor so that he can
make the decision whether to sell or to retain his securities; (2) the need
not to place the security holder in a position in which he would have to
make a hasty decision; and (3) the attempt to place the security holder in
a position in which he would have a fair opportunity to tender.45 All of
these considerations are contemplated by § 14(d), even though the special
bid is not within the "classic" tender offer definition. While such consid-
erations do not expressly preclude the use of special bids, defining the bid
as a statutory tender offer does require compliance with the withdrawal
and pro rata provisions. However, allowing the option to be withdrawn
and the purchase of shares offered beyond the 15-minute period on a pro
rata basis is inconsistent with the technique of the special bid. Therefore,
the SEC position effectively rules out the use of the special bid as a tech-
nique available for corporate acquisition.
C. A Limitation: Mergers
While the treatment of the special bid indicates that activities which
threaten the interests of the intended beneficiaries of § 14(d) may be
44 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8392 (Aug. 30, 1968), [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. LAW REP. 5 77,715 at 83,637.
4 5 See comments of Mr. Levenson in response to a question by Mr. Flom, PLI Transcript
Series No. 1, supra note 25, at 366.
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deemed statutory tender offers even at the cost of precluding that technique,
the case of Smallwood v. Southdown, Inc.46 indicates a limitation, at least
in an exclusionary sense, on the more expansive reading of § 14(d). The
specific holding of the case was that the requirements of § 14(d) do not
apply to situations in which prospective merger partners secure, through
proxy solicitation, shareholder approval of a mutually agreed-upon merger
contract. This conclusion is consistent with the policy of the Williams
Act to provide the shareholders with adequate information in the areas in
which the proxy rules do not operate. The case can also be read, however,
to add the concept that where information is available through other
sources, there is no need for the operation of § 14(d).
Southdown concerned the merger of Pearl Brewing Company into South-
down and did not involve a cash tender offer. The merger agreement
provided that there would be a tax-free stock-for-stock exchange and an
option for a shareholder to obtain cash for a portion of this stock with a
capital gains treatment. Plaintiff Smallwood contended that a letter from
Southdown to the Pearl shareholders constituted a tender offer, or request
or invitation for tenders within the meaning of § 14(d). The court con-
cluded that the letter in question did not constitute a tender offer within
the meaning of § 14(d). Judge Hughes stated that
Southdown clearly did not seek to acquire control of Pearl through a cash
tender offer, hostile or otherwise. The acquisition of Pearl was to be ac-
complished through a mutually agreed merger contract approved by the
stockholders. Sections 14(d) and (e) are not applicable to this form of
corporate acquisition. 47
The refusal to apply § 14(d) to the letter in question is an implicit rec-
ognition of the fact that it would be impossible, indeed absurd, to attempt
to apply the substantive regulations embodied in §§ 14(d) (5), (6), and
(7) to the merger technique. Therefore, this refusal supports the unartic-
ulated premise of § 14(d), which is to regulate takeover bids and, yet, not
preclude methods of corporate acquisition in situations in which the dangers
protected against by the Williams Act are not present.
In its analysis, the Southdown court detailed the items of information
required to be disclosed under § 14(d). It also indicated that the plaintiff
suffered no damage due to the failure to file the required schedules, be-
cause the defendants had already disclosed, at the time of the transaction,
all the pertinent facts through the proxy statement, underwriting agree-
"ment, and the preliminary prospectus. The implication with regard to the
scope of § 14(d) is clear, and the policy basis of the decision is sound.
Section 14(d) is redundant and should not be operative in cases in which
the information required by its schedules is available through other means
46CCH FED. SEc. LAw REP. 5 93,435 at 92,154 (1971-1972 Transfer Binder).
471d. at 92,157.
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to all the parties protected by the statute. The requirements of § 14(d)
should be applied only when necessary to protect the interests of share-
'holders and to give the target company the needed time and information
to present its recommendations to shareholders.
D. Does Section 14(d) Contain an Implied
"Private Offering" Exemption?
1. The Negotiated Offer
Unlike the Ohio Take-Over Act, the Williams, Act provides no express
minimum number exemption for tender offers. Therefore, § 14(d) leaves
open the question of whether an offer to a small group of stockholders is a
statutory offer, or whether such an offer is exempt on the theory that the
statute applies only to "public" offers. A person in the negotiated or mar-
ket transaction may achieve functionally the same results as those sought
to be prevented by the Williams Act. Just as with a conventional tender
offer, such acquisitions may have a great impact upon the market for an is-
suer's shares, subsequently resulting in a change in the control of the is-
suer. When a person, as discussed earlier, makes known his intention to
periodically acquire shares of the issuer in the open market in an amount
that would result in the ownership of more than five percent, such casual
market transactions may institute a statutory tender offer. To be sure, the
activities are outside the usual meaning of tender offer; however that alone
will not keep them out of § 14(d). Section 14(d) (8) (B) provides an
exemption only if the acquisition, together with all other acquisitions of
securities of the same class by the same person during the preceding twelve
months, would not exceed two per cent of that class. The problem was
discussed above, and it was concluded that § 14(d) (8) (B) indicates no
implicit exclusion for such transactions. However, the negotiated transac-
tion presents a more difficult problem. The strongest argument against in-
clusion of negotiated transaction is that the Act was not designed to deal
with problems involved in face-to-face negotiations in which a transfer of
control is involved. In negotiated transactions the terms and arrangements
are arrived at through direct communication and negotiation between the
offeror and the shareholders involved. This is unlike the classic offer situ-
ation, which connotes a broadscale offer to large numbers of shareholders.
The legislative history of the Williams Bill emphasizes an intent to protect
these shareholders, and one could strongly argue that this focus on large
numbers of shareholders carries with it an implicit exemption for the pri-
vate offering situation. In a negotiated transaction, the offerees are in a
position of strength and are able to deal with the offeror at arm's length,
possibly without the need for the protections afforded by § 14(d) . 8
48 Cf. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
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It can be reasonably argued that the applicability of the § 14(d) re-
quirements to offers to small groups of stockholders should be subject to
the same tests used in determining a "private offering" exemption under §
4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. In that situation, whether a transaction
is one not involving a public offering is essentially a question of fact and
necessitates a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances, including
such factors as the relationship between the offerees and the issuer and the
nature, scope, size, type, and manner of the offering.49
The Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.50 noted that the ex-
emption for the private offering situation must be interpreted in the light
of the statutory purpose:
The design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure
of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions ...
Since exempt transactions are those as to which "there is no practical need
for [the bill's] application," the applicability of 4(1)5 1 should turn on
whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the
Act. An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for them-
selves is a transaction "not involving any public offering." 52
The Court stated that the number of offerees is not conclusive as to the
availability of the exemption, since the statute applies to an offering
"whether to few or many." It should be emphasized, therefore, that the
number of persons to whom the offer is extended is conceptually relevant
only to the question of whether these persons have the requisite associa-
tion with and knowledge of the issuer to make the exemption available.
While the Ralston Court indicated that nothing prevented the Commission
from using some kind of numerical test in deciding when to investigate
particular exemption claims, 54 it is apparent that any arbitrary number
would be nonproductive and that a more flexible standard is needed. This
is also true in the tender offer situation. The SEC has considered provid-
ing an exemption if the offer is made only to a certain number of persons.
There is language in the release covering § 14(d)2 regarding an exemp-
tion for offers to not more than ten security holders during any period of
12 months.5 5 However, the rule finally promulgated did not contain such
an exclusion. 6 The SEC staff subsequently indicated that the ten person
49 Id. at 158.
5 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
51This section is now codified as § 4(2). 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
52 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953) (foomotes omitted).
53 Id. at 125.
54 Id.
55 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8392 (Aug. 30, 1968), [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. LAW REP. 5 77,715, at 83,637.
56 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-2 (1972).
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limitation should be disregarded,57 and a member of the staff has been
quoted as saying that the language was "accidental."58
The Ralston Purina analysis can be useful in the determination of
whether a private offering exemption is implicit in the Williams Act. The
primary purpose of § 14(d) is to provide information not otherwise avail-
able to stockholders so that they will be able to evaluate the merits of the
offer. The exemptive provisions of § 4(2) of the 1933 Act and of Rule
14a-2 (a) 5 9 under the proxy rules of the 1934 Act are based upon the phi-
losophy that there is no need for disclosure in cases in which all of the of-
ferees or persons solicited have easy access to or knowledge of the requi-
site information. Therefore, to the extent that stockholders have access to
information and can negotiate on their own behalf, they do not need the
protection of the disclosure provisions. In the tender offer situation, how-
ever, disclosure operates not only to directly inform the shareholders but
also, in part, to give management adequate time to prepare a response to
the tender offer, so that the shareholder will have the benefit of that recom-
mendation in deciding whether or not to tender. Management cannot be
presumed to have adequate information from which to both investigate
the purchaser and present recommendations, merely because large share-
holders who are privately contacted have some information and know the
offeror's identity. It is true that the 1933 Act and Williams Act situations
are not exactly parallel; however, that does not mean the basic philosophy
'is inapposite. Focusing solely on the interests of the shareholder to whom
the offer is made, the negotiated offer would not be within the statute.
However, if the interests of the target and of the shareholder to whom the
offer is not made are considered, strong support is found for the idea that
some of these bids should come within the scope of § 14(d).
2. Proposed Rule 146 as a Guide
In determining the contours of § 14(d) in the areas beyond the "clas-
sic" offer, certain of the tests embodied in Proposed SEC Rule 14660 are
relevant to the tender offer situation. It is suggested, therefore, that the
SEC adopt a similar rule, tailored to fit the tender offer, to serve as a guide
in determining the scope of § 14(d).
Proposed Rule 146 deals with issuer transactions which do not involve
a public offering within the meaning of § 4(2). It states that to be ex-
empted, the securities must be offered and sold in a negotiated transac-
tion." The rule defines a negotiated transaction as one in which the offer-
57 See comments of Mr. Levenson, PLI Transcript Series No. 1 supra note 25, at 365.
58 Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAw. 1637,
1643 (1971).
59 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(a) (1972).
60 Proposed Rule 146, 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137 (1972) (proposed as 17 C.F.R. § 230.146).
"IId. (§ 230.146(c) (1)).
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ing and the terms and arrangements of sale are made through direct com-
munication between the issuer and the purchaser.6" The rule further indi-
cates that any seminar or promotional meeting or any letter, circular, no-
tice, or other written communication sent, given, or communicated to
persons other than in connection with a negotiated transaction shall consti-
tute general advertising and preclude a private offering."3 In addition, and
most important for the parallel to the tender offer situation, rule 146(e)
divides the governed offerees into two distinct groups." The first group
is comprised of offerees who have the same kind of information that the
1933 Act would make available in the form of a registration statement.
The second group is made up of offerees who have access to such informa-
tion. In addition, both groups are given access to any further information
that they may need to verify any information previously provided.65 How-
ever, before an analogy to the tender offer situation can be made, it is
necessary to determine precisely what kinds of offerees fall within each of
these groups. To make this determination rule 146(e) must be read in
conjunction with the case law regarding § 4(2).
In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,6" the Supreme Court was faced with the
problem of determining whether or not a private offering exemption existed
for Ralston Purina's unregistered offerings of its stock to its employees.
In denying the exemption, the Court made a critical distinction between
two groups. It is this distinction that gives meaning to the two-pronged
delineation in rule 146(e). The only employees involved in the Ral-
ston-Purina offerings were those who requested information regarding the
purchase of company stock. The Court stated that an offering to some em-
ployees, "e.g., one made to executive personnel who because of their posi-
tion have access to the same kind of information that the Act would make
available in the form of a registration statement,"' 7 may not constitute a
public offering. However, the Court also took notice of the fact that
[almong those responding to these offers were employees with the duties
of artist, bakeshop foreman, chow loading foreman, clerical assistant, copy-.
writer, electrician, stock clerk, mill office clerk, order credit trainee, pro-
duction trainee, stenographer, and veterinarian. 68
The conclusion was that "the exemption question turns on the knowledge
of the offerees ... [so that] ... [t]he focus of inquiry should be on the
need of the offerees for the protections afforded by registration."'' Because
621d. (§ 230.146(a) (3)).
63Id. (§§ 230.146(c) (2) (i)-(iv)).
64 Id. (§ 230.146(e) (1)).
65d. (§ 230.146(e) (2)).
66 346 U.S. 119 (1954).
67 Id. at 125-26 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted).
188M. at 121.
69 Id. at 126-27.
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the second category of employees (the one including the bakeshop fore-
man and the clerical assistant) did not have access to the kind of informA-
tion which registration would disclose, there was no private offering exemp-
tion for unregistered offerings involving those employees. The key dif-
ference is the kind of knowledge garnered by an executive in his day-to-day
work and the kind of information gleened by the bakeshop foreman or
the clerical assistant in his. To put the bakeshop foreman in a position
where he does not need the protections provided by registration, there
must be a showing of "special circumstances." 70 Therefore, the next task
is to determine how the issuer can establish these circumstances.
A substantial portion of the answer to this question was resolved by
the Fifth Circuit in SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co.71 The investors in-
volved included "dentists, physicians, housewives, and business men, who
had no relationship with Continental other than that of shareholder. ' 72
Therefore, they fall within the same category as the bakeshop foreman
and the clerical assistant in Ralston-Purina. The district court " had found
that the information included in a brochure7 4 provided to the investors was
of the "same type and kind.., that would have otherwise been provided
'in a registration statement filed pursuant to [the] Securities Act of
1933 ' ' and that, therefore, they were fully aware of the risks of their in-
vestment and did not need the protections afforded by a registration state-
ment. However, the circuit court reversed and held that "Continental
failed to sustain its burden of affirmatively proving that all of the offerees
of Continental enjoyed a relationship with Continental making registration
unnecessary. ' 7  In denying the exemption, the court spoke directly to the
requirements for making a private offering to this kind of group and de-
70 Id. at 126.
71463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
72Id. at 158.
73 326 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
74 Id. at 590. The brochure was described as follows:
One of the investors testified that the brochure which he received provided him ac-
cess to information concerning the terms of the offering (total number of shares being
offered, the offering price, and the par value per share); the speculative factors of his
investment; the history of the defendant corporation, including its prior bankruptcy;
the nature of the defendant cqrporation's business, including the product to be produced
and the plan for its distribution; the authorized and outstanding debt and capital stock
of the defendant, together with the options outstanding to purchase common stock; the
intended use of proceeds from the sale of common stock; the management of the defen-
dant corporation with their background; a complete description of the capital stock of
the defendant corporation, including dividend and voting rights of both defendant's
common and preferred stock and the redemption, conversion and preference rights to
which the defendant was a party, including this injunction proceeding and the entry of
the temporary injunction; an unaudited financial statement, including a balance sheet
and an income and disbursement or "operating" statement.
75 Id. at 591.
7 6 SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 161 (5th Cir. 1972).
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tailed three points which would presumably establish the exemption.7'
First, the issuer must affirmatively prove that all offerees of its securities
had received the kind of information contained in a registration statement.
Second, the issuer must show that all offerees had access to any additional
information which they might have required or requested. Thus there
must be an actual opportunity offered to inspect records and to verify state-
ments which served as inducements for purchases. " Third, the issuer must
prove that all offerees had personal contacts with the officers of the corpo-
ration. It is the last requirement which was the stumbling block in Conti-
nental and will be in most cases. In Continental, the court found it cru-
cial that two of the offerees never "prior to their purchase had occasion to
meet with officers of Continental.."79 However, it is doubtful that a single
meeting with corporate officials would satisfy the requirement. The court
used the phrase "personal contact" which implies more than the formality
of a meeting and suggests an on-going or long-standing relationship. Al-
though the precise nature of the relationship will vary with the situation,
it must be such that it creates special advantages in the purchaser which
make him substantially different from members of the general investment
public.
To tailor rule 146 to the tender offer situation, the information made
available would have to be the information required by § 14(d), and
the negotiations would be between the shareholders and the offeror, not
the issuer. The operation of the rule would mean that any widespread
advertisement or solicitation would be equated to "general advertising"
and would preclude an exemption. The key inquiries would be whether the
offer was made to all shareholders of the target and whether all the pro-
tected parties possessed the necessary information to make operation of
§ 14(d) a redundancy. This would incorporate the first and second req-
uisites detailed in Continental. However, the third requirement would
seem inapposite in the tender offer situation if applied to the relationship
between the offeror and the target shareholders. Since the offeror is an
outsider to the target, it is highly improbable (if not impossible) that a
group comprised of target shareholders who also have the required relation-
ship to the offeror could be found. Therefore, it is appropriate to provide
that the group have the necessary relationship with the issuer, not the of-
feror. This would effectively limit the exemption to a few major holders,
such as a family group in a closely held corporation, and it would ensure
77M. at 160. The exact language is:
Continental did not affirmatively prove that all offerees of its securities had received
both written and oral information concerning Continental, that all offerees of its secu-
rities had access to any additional information which they might have required or re-
quested, and that all offerees of its securities had personal contacts with the officers
of Continental.
781d. at 158.
791d. at 160.
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that the group would have the advantage of the informational input from
both the target and the offeror. Since the protected parties have, through
other sources, the advantages of the informational input provided by §
14(d), there is no need to trigger either the disclosure or substantive pro-
visions of the Williams Act because the offer was made "to those who are
shown to be able to fend for themselves."" ° This would deny an implied
private offering exemption within § 14(d) in all cases except those in
which the informational flow is sufficient to obviate the dangers which
prompted passage of the Williams Bill. Such a rule would also provide
an exclusionary test as illustrated by the Southdown case and would be
consistent with the result in Cattlemen's (where the defendant contended
that the negotiated transaction was not within the Act) and with the SEC
treatment of the "special bid."
IX. CONCLUSION
Section 14(d) encompasses a large, but not totally defined, group of ten-
der offers. The group is made up of cash offers and exchange offers which
will result in direct or indirect beneficial ownership of five percent of a
listed or registered security. There is another group not within the statute
made up of offers which will result in less than five percent ownership,
and of offers for securities of smaller or more closely held companies.
The SEC has yet to set forth firm definitional boundaries, and has left the
matter to a case-by-case adjudication. While this approach tends to ensure
compliance with the Act for border-line activities, it is not entirely free
from difficulty. Over-extension of the statute's scope could have the ef-
fect of seriously discouraging the use of the tender offer. This would be
contrary to the premise of the statute which is to regulate tender offers, not
to prevent them. Since the passage of § 14(d), there has been a decrease
in the use of the cash tender offer; however it is not certain whether this
decrease is due to § 14(d) or to other factors.81 If § 14(d) is a significant
factor causing the decrease, then a restructuring of the scope and operation
of the "trigger" clause is required. The goal of shareholder protection and
the danger of "chilling" tenders must be balanced in each situation before
arriving at a decision whether or not the activity involved is a statutory
offer. Although few courts have dealt directly with the definitional prob-
lem, a working solution to the definitional ambiguity which would achieve
the results needed with regard to compliance and predictability is emerg-
ing. Cattlemen's extends § 14(d) to transactions other than the tradi-
tional offer and indicates that the mode of communication is not crucial.
80 Cf. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1950).
81 'The cash tender offer is being replaced by the exchange offer as the favored technique for
accomplishing a take-over. It is difficult to say that the Williams Bill is either solely or largely
responsible for this shift in technique... ." Mundheim, Tender Offers, 2 REV. OF SEC. REG.
953, 956 (1969).
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Southdown has placed an outer limit on the statute's operation. Thus at
least the initial steps in developing the scope of the statutory tender offer
have been taken.
This note has suggested that the SEC adopt a rule which tailors certain
basic concepts in Proposed Rule 146 to the tender offer technique. Such
an approach would allow the expansion of § 14(d) beyond the "classic"
tender offer and would provide at least an exclusionary basis for predicta-
bility. While not suggesting adoption of a rule similar to Proposed Rule
146, two commentators have arrived at a similar conclusion regarding the
emerging scope of the Williams Act:
Any widespread solicitation of stock sales, other than in normal market pur-
chases, is likely to be regarded as a "tender offer" by the SEC staff. This
criterion might allow approaches to a few major holders, such as a family
group, without subjection to Section 14(d), but would inhibit any broader
program of solicitation, as for example by use of a stockholder list. It is
our view, however, that all the circumstances of a particular case should
be examined, and the SEC staff perhaps consulted, before any solicitation is
undertaken.82
At this point in time, the statement above is a most accurate description of
the scope of § 14(d) and seems to have captured the intended thrust of
the Williams Act. What is needed now is promulgation of a rule by the
SEC to give definite guidelines to provide not only predictability for busi-
ness planning purposes, but also protection for the intended beneficiaries
of the Act.
fames R. King
82 Robinson & Mahoney, Schedule 13D: Wild Card in the Takeover Deck, 27 Bus. LAw.
1107, 1115 (1972).
NOTES1973]
